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Our Courts, Ourselves:  How the
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal
System*
Deborah R. Hensler**
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-seven years ago, Professor Frank Sander urged Ameri-
can lawyers and judges to re-imagine the civil courts as a collection
of dispute resolution procedures tailored to fit the variety of dis-
putes that parties bring to the justice system.1  Professor Sander’s
vision of the justice system encompassed traditional litigation lead-
ing to trial, but his speech at the 1976 Roscoe Pound Conference
drew attention to alternatives to traditional dispute resolution that
he argued would better serve disputants and society than traditional
adversarial processes.2
Today, interest in dispute resolution is high.3  This interest cuts
across many domains, ranging from the family, to the schoolyard, to
* Originally published in 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165 (2003).
** Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Stanford Center on Conflict
and Negotiation, the University of Missouri Law School at Columbia, the Yale-
Quinnipiac Dispute Resolution Seminar, and the Stanford Law School faculty
workshop.  Thanks to participants in those seminars for their comments and
suggestions.
As feminists of a certain age will recognize, my title draws its inspiration from a
famous health manual, Our Bodies, Ourselves, whose title reflected the under-
standing that the personal and the political are intertwined. See BOSTON WOMEN’S
HEALTH BOOK COLLECTIVE, OUR BODIES, OURSELVES FOR THE NEW CENTURY:
A BOOK BY AND FOR WOMEN (1998).  As my paper indicates, I think the dispute
resolution movement in the United States similarly reflects the mixing of personal
and socio-political aims and desires.
1. Frank Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Before the Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
2. Id.
3. There are many indicators of this interest, but in the spirit of the times, in
preparing this paper, I searched the Internet for evidence of the proposition.  Us-
ing Yahoo as my search engine, I found more than one million pages mentioning,
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workplaces and sales transactions, to community decision making,
and to the courts.  It is reflected in academic degree programs, law
school and business school curricula, executive training, and contin-
uing legal education.4  The dispute resolution procedures of interest
include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and hybrids such as
“med-arb”5 and “reg-neg.”6  While in some domains, such as
schools and neighborhoods, dispute resolution procedures are
championed as alternatives to individual or social violence, in the
business and legal sectors the primary stated objective of alterna-
tive dispute resolution is to avoid litigation and trial.
Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) procedures have not
displaced traditional litigation; hundreds of thousands of lawsuits
are filed annually in state and federal courts.  But there are some
reasons to believe that the ADR movement has had some success
respectively, mediation, arbitration, and conflict resolution and more than eighty
thousand pages mentioning peace studies.  Under “bus & econ/shopping & ser-
vices/law/alternative dispute resolution/companies & firms,” I found 274 sites re-
lated to dispute resolution.  The sites included individuals and organizations;
groups offering professional services and groups offering volunteer opportunities;
and entities providing information about dispute resolution, training, and general
and specialized dispute resolution services.  There were specialists in divorce and
family law, securities, “major financial controversies and complex multi-party dis-
putes,” construction and legal malpractice.  There were rosters of judges and there
were cyberspace dispute resolution services, including “cybersettle” and
“iCourthouse.”  Under “conflict resolution,” I found undergraduate and graduate
education programs, community organizations in states around the nation, and
projects and institutes in countries around the world.  Searching for texts on Ama-
zon.com, I found 1,268 books on “conflict resolution,” 654 books on “dispute reso-
lution,” 1,654 books on arbitration, and 1,041 books on mediation.  Note that both
the web search and the Amazon book search categories are non-exclusive, mean-
ing that some web pages and books are counted more than once.
4. Scholars and practitioners in these fields variously term their subject alter-
native dispute resolution (“ADR”), conflict resolution, litigation risk management,
negotiation theory, and peace studies.  For convenience, I use the term dispute
resolution to refer generally to all of these, and alternative dispute resolution to
describe the movement to substitute or complement traditional litigation proce-
dures with mediation, arbitration, and other procedures that are perceived as less
adversarial.
5. In a “med-arb” procedure, a third party neutral first attempts to help the
parties to fashion a resolution of their dispute.  But if this proves impossible, the
neutral then hears and decides the outcome of the dispute.  Some dispute resolu-
tion practitioners oppose this melding of mediation and arbitration on the grounds
that it may erode the perceived neutrality of mediators.
6. In a “reg-neg” proceeding, an administrative agency invites those affected
by a proposed new regulation to participate in the drafting of the regulation, as-
sisted by a third-party neutral.  The goal is to avoid lawsuits challenging the final
regulation.  Congress endorsed “reg-neg” in the Administrative Dispute Resolu-
tion Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11(a), 110 Stat. 3870, 3873. See Cary Cog-
lianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule-
Making, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997).
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over the past twenty-five years in changing business and legal deci-
sion-makers’ views of how best to resolve legal disputes.  Courts’
civil caseloads have declined significantly over the past decade in
many jurisdictions.7  At the same time, there has been a dramatic
decrease in the fraction of civil cases reaching trial.8  Federal courts
are now required by law to offer some form of ADR,9 and many
state courts require parties to attempt to resolve their cases through
mediation before they can obtain a trial date.10  Outside the courts,
the use of binding arbitration appears to be on the rise.11  How did
these changes come about?  What factors have created the surge of
interest in alternatives to litigation?  What do these developments
portend for our legal system?12
7. For trends in state court case filings, see Nat’l Center for State Courts,
Caseload Highlights, at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/CSP_Main_
Page.html (last visited June 27, 2003).  For trends in federal court filings, see Ad-
min. Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistical Reports, at http://www.courts.net/fed/in
dex.html (last visited June 27, 2003).
8. See Patrick Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55
SMU L. REV. 1405 (2002).
9. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2003).
10. The National Center for State Courts tracks ADR developments in state
courts. See, e.g., Nat’l Center for State Courts, Court Links to the 50 States, at
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/KMO/Topics/ADR/States/ADRusmap.htm (last visited
June 27, 2003).  For descriptions of ADR programs in federal appellate and district
courts, see ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS
(1997); ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS
(1996).
11. The American Arbitration Association reports having administered more
than 200,000 arbitration proceedings in 2002. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Fast
Facts, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235 (last visited June 27, 2003).
From 1990 to 2002, the AAA’s caseload increased 379 percent, as calculated from
data provided by the AAA on file with the author.
12. These changes are not limited to the United States.  ADR is a key feature
of the civil justice reform program recently adopted in the United Kingdom, see
Lord Woolf’s Final Report, available at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civil/finalfr.htm (last
visited July 30, 2003)), and mediation is encouraged or mandated in other common
law systems. See Mandatory Mediation, Courts of Justice Act Rule 24.1, R.R.O.
1990, REGULATION 194, Amended to Ontario Reg. 263/03,Ontario, Canada; Su-
preme Court, New South Wales, Australia, Practice Note 88: Differential Case
Management, Part 10 Alternative Dispute Resolution, available at http://www.law
link.nsw.gov.au (last visited Aug. 11, 2003).  Moreover, the World Bank has
adopted ADR as a key component of its judicial reform agenda for developing
economies. See Manuel Gomez, Shooting first and finding out later?  The Inclu-
sion of ADR within the World Bank’s Judicial Reform Agendas (2002) (unpub-
lished seminar paper, Stanford Law School) (on file with author).  Many of these
developments outside the United States are modeled on the United States’
experience.
352 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:349
To my knowledge, no one has yet written a comprehensive his-
tory of the dispute resolution movement in the United States.13  In
any event, there are no doubt myriad understandings of that his-
tory.  In this paper, I present a perspective on just one part of that
history:  the evolution of alternative dispute resolution in the legal
world.  It is my personal perspective, drawing on the literature of
the past several decades, as well as my experience working in this
field as a policy analyst, legal scholar, and law teacher.  It is a criti-
cal perspective that would be contested by many of my colleagues
in the field.  I offer it to provoke thinking and discussion, recogniz-
ing that others would interpret the evidence differently.
II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS:  PURITANS, POPULISTS, AND
UTOPIANS
Discontent with the law’s approach to resolving disputes seems
endemic to human societies.  Roman citizens extolled Cicero when
he defended popular figures, but turned against him when he took
on unpopular causes.14  In Shakespeare’s King Henry VI, Dick the
butcher offers to rebel Jack Cade the memorable suggestion:  “The
first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”15  Charles Dickens de-
voted an entire novel to the tale of an interminable lawsuit,
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, which grinds through the court so slowly
that by the time the suit is concluded there is nothing left of the
inheritance the disputants were arguing about.16
But we do not need to go beyond our shores to find historical
antecedents for the contemporary alternative dispute resolution
movement.  As Paul Carrington tells us, the Puritan settlers of New
England had little use for law or legal process.17  Jacksonian popu-
lists had little use for lawyers.18
Members of America’s utopian societies yearned for social har-
mony and eschewed conflict.19  One of their goals was to eliminate
adversarial legal processes.  In Edward Bellamy’s utopia, depicted
13. But see Paul Carrington, ADR and the Future of Adjudication: A Primer
on Dispute Resolution, 15 REV. LITIG. 485 (1996).
14. ROBERT WILKIN, ETERNAL LAWYER: A LEGAL BIOGRAPHY OF CICERO
(1947).
15. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH,
act 4, sc. 2.  It is worth noting that Shakespeare depicts Dick as part of a disorderly
rabble that Cade has attracted to his rebellion; the lawyers here symbolize the
forces of order, not the forces of evil.
16. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books
1971) (1853).
17. Carrington, supra note 13, at 485-86.
18. Id. at 490.
19. See AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS (Donald E. Pitzer ed., 1997).
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in his wildly popular 1888 novel Looking Backward, citizens are
inducted into the army of a corporatist state to which all contribute
and from which all receive the necessities of life.20  As communitar-
ian values replace private interest, economic competition, social
conflict, and adversarial processes are eliminated.  Wise citizens
take the place of judges and juries in deciding when and how to
punish bad behavior, lawyers’ services become superfluous, and law
itself is discarded.21  As one character in the novel observes:
We have no such things as law schools.  The law as a special sci-
ence is obsolete.  It was a system of casuistry which the elaborate
artificiality of the old order of society absolutely required to in-
terpret it, but only a few of the plainest and simplest legal max-
ims have any application to the existing state of the world.
Everything touching the relations of men to one another is now
simpler, beyond any comparison, than in your day.  We should
have no sort of use for the hair-splitting experts who presided
and argued in your courts.22
Bellamy’s novel inspired a new political movement known as
Nationalism, which comprised a network of grassroots organiza-
tions dedicated to creating a utopian society devoid of economic
and social conflict, and led to the establishment of the Populist
Party.23
Many in the Nationalist movement had ties with Theosophy,  a
contemporary religious movement.24  Theosophy was dedicated to
“substituting universal brotherhood and cooperation for competi-
tion,” and its leaders were initially captivated by Bellamy’s seem-
ingly similar social vision.25  But the roots of Theosophy lay in
spiritualism26 and the elevation of “the divine spirit within” individ-
20. EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000-1887 (1960).  I am grate-
ful to my colleague Barbara Babcock for bringing Bellamy’s novel and the Nation-
alist movement to my attention.  Babcock describes the movement (and its ties to
Theosophy) in her biography of Clara Foltz. See Barbara Babcock (2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author).  Bellamy’s novel was second only to Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin in number of copies sold. See John Hope
Franklin, Edward Bellamy and the Nationalist Movement, 11 NEW ENG. Q. 739
(Dec. 1938); Elizabeth Sadler, One Book’s Influence: Edward Bellamy’s Looking
Backward, 17 NEW ENG. Q. 530 (Dec. 1944).
21. BELLAMY, supra note 20, at 142.
22. Id.
23. Erich Fromm, Preface to EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD,
2000-1887, at vi (1960).
24. J. Gordon Melton, The Theosophical Communities and Their Ideal of Uni-
versal Brotherhood, in AMERICA’S COMMUNAL UTOPIAS 396 (Donald E. Pitzer ed.,
1997).
25. Id. at 398.
26. Id. at 400.
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uals, and their leaders eschewed social activism and politics.27  As
the Nationalist leaders turned increasingly to electoral politics and
socialism to implement their ideals, the two movements parted
company.28
Few today remember the movement Bellamy’s novel inspired.
But the rhetoric of the modern dispute resolution movement ech-
oes the longing for greater meaning in one’s personal life that char-
acterized Theosophy, the desire for social harmony that
characterized Nationalism, and both of these earlier movements’
beliefs that spirituality and harmony will be facilitated by the de-
cline of formal law and adversarial processes.
III. THE COMMUNITY JUSTICE MOVEMENT:  WRESTING POWER
FROM THE COURTS
The modern history of alternative dispute resolution in the law
has multiple strands, which have been woven together in a complex
fashion over the past several decades.  One strand has been termed
the “community justice movement,” which arose in the late 1960s
and early 1970s as a part of the community empowerment
movement.
The animating notion of the community justice movement is
that formal legal institutions, including the courts, are mechanisms
for maintaining the power of elite groups, allowing them to govern
with impunity and to exploit the less powerful.  These institutions
impose dispute resolution norms that may be alien—or even harm-
ful—to other members of the community.  In addition, by mono-
polizing dispute resolution, formal legal institutions and their
lawyer agents prevent community members (i.e., the non-elite)
from learning how to master their own environments and ulti-
mately, their own lives.  To take control of their lives and communi-
ties, community justice advocates argue, people need to build
grassroots justice institutions that apply community-based norms to
disputes, and rely on community members to resolve disputes.29
The community justice movement gained support when racial
violence swept American cities in the 1960s, starkly illustrating the
alienation and dis-empowerment of black Americans.  The ideas as-
sociated with the community justice movement were consistent as
well with the community/neighborhood empowerment ideology of
27. Id. at 399.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SCHWERIN, MEDIATION, CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT,
AND TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS (1995).
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the Johnson administration’s “war on poverty.”  But not all sup-
porters of community-based justice were driven by leftist political
ideology.  Some envisaged community justice as a return to a time
when religious institutions and village elders were primary sources
of resolution of disputes within families and neighborhoods.  More-
over, some left-oriented scholars—hearkening back to the same
history but assessing it differently—opposed the rise of community
justice institutions.  To these scholars, “community justice” looked
like an elite strategy for denying access to the public courts to less
powerful members of the community who had only recently won
legal remedies for infringements of their rights.30
The most complete manifestations of community justice as em-
powerment and dispute resolution were the community boards es-
tablished in San Francisco, which—as their name suggests—
attempted to set up an alternative governance structure, including
dispute resolution, at the local level.31  Most other communities
adopted a more conservative vision, establishing community or
neighborhood justice centers that provided neighborhood volun-
teers to resolve neighbor-to-neighbor and family disputes, but were
not envisaged as alternative governance structures.  Community
justice centers were funded variously by the federal and local gov-
ernments and national and local foundations that were seeking
remedies for social violence.32
From the first, community justice organizations adopted medi-
ation and other conciliatory approaches, rather than adjudication,
as their preferred mode of dispute resolution.  While this may seem
like an obvious decision for a movement aimed, in part, at a return
to traditional modes of dispute resolution, it is worth noting, be-
cause while some traditional cultures rely on conciliatory dispute
resolution processes, others use adjudicative processes.33  The
30. RICHARD ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE (1982); JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983).  For a
more recent discussion of the disempowering potential of the dispute resolution
movement, see Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierar-
chy and Pacification in the Movement To Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993).
31. Raymond Shonholtz, Justice from Another Perspective: The Ideology and
Developmental History of the Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF
POPULAR JUSTICE (Sally Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993).
32. Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the
Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282
(1993); Mark Hoffman, Grants To Aid Study of Judicial Reforms, BUS. INS., Apr.
11, 1988, at 14.
33. For example, although traditional Chinese culture is often perceived as
embracing mediation, examination of historical records indicates that what was
termed “conciliation” by the Chinese was often an adjudicative procedure admin-
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adoption of mediation by community justice centers may have re-
flected a belief that mediation—often characterized by its support-
ers as antithetical to adversarial dispute resolution processes—was
more likely to nurture positive relationships within the community.
Because mediation leaves the power to decide a dispute in the dis-
putants’ hands, rather than relegating it to a third-party neutral, it
may also have seemed consistent with the power-sharing ethos of
some community justice activists.  But reliance on mediation also
may have reflected a recognition that community-based systems
could only resolve disputes to the extent that disputants were will-
ing to accept the outcomes of community processes.
Although rejection of formal legal norms was an aspect of the
community justice movement, lawyers played significant roles in es-
tablishing and nurturing many neighborhood justice centers.  And,
in very short order, most neighborhood justice centers developed
close working relationships with the courts that served their neigh-
borhoods.34  The genesis of these relationships suggests something
interesting about Americans’ preferences for dispute resolution.  In
most instances, neighborhood justice centers turned to courts for
referrals of disputes because they discovered that fewer neighbor-
hood residents sought out their services than they had anticipated.
Indeed, some centers found that it was easier to find residents eager
to be trained as mediators, than it was to find citizens who wanted
the centers to mediate their disputes.  The failure of neighborhood
justice centers to generate large numbers of “clients” may have re-
flected barriers to dissemination of information about the centers’
existence and what they offered; generally, these centers operated
on shoe-string budgets and could not afford sophisticated market-
ing campaigns.  Or the lack of large numbers of clients may have
reflected a lack of understanding among neighbor and family dispu-
tants of the value of conciliatory dispute resolution processes, by
comparison with litigation (or violence).  But one study of disputes
within a large urban community concluded that many citizens chose
to take disputes to court, rather than to more informal dispute reso-
lution institutions, because they valued public vindication of their
istered by local leaders who substituted informal social norms for formal legal
rules of decision. See Xiaobing Xu, Mediation in China and the United States:
Toward Common Outcome (2003) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Stanford Law
School) (on file with author).  Moreover, even when Chinese third-party neutrals
presided over a true mediation process, they often used the threat of formal adju-
dication as a means of exerting pressure on disputants to compromise. Id.
34. Even the San Francisco community boards’ movement ultimately found
itself dependent on the court for case referrals. See Shonholtz, supra note 31.
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rights or positions.35  Perhaps at least some of those who eschewed
the services provided by neighborhood justice centers deliberately
rejected conciliation shaped by informal norms, in favor of adjudi-
cation based on formal legal norms.36
In any event, over time, many community justice centers set-
tled into relationships with their local courts in which the courts
referred “minor” disputes, including criminal complaints, to the
centers for resolution.  Courts viewed the referrals as a means of
reducing the workload of court personnel.  Some judges who saw
the same disputants before them time and again also hoped that
neighborhood-based mediators might be more successful than they
themselves were in producing lasting resolutions.  Others wanted
mainly to get troublesome cases—what judges sometimes refer to
as the “cats and dogs”—out of their courtrooms.
Some types of referrals generated criticism, as when instances
of family violence were referred to neighborhood justice centers for
mediation.  Feminists and others argued that the informality of me-
diation facilitated manipulation of women who were prone to sub-
mit to their more powerful male partners, particularly if mediators
adhering to strict interpretations of mediator neutrality refrained
from intervening to protect less powerful disputants from more
powerful adversaries.37  Some neighborhood justice center leaders
worried that courts were simply using their centers as palliative
measures to correct funding shortfalls.38
35. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Sally Merry & Su-
san Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST.
SYS. J. 151 (1984).
36. For a discussion of individuals’ relative preferences for mediation, adjudi-
cation, and other forms of dispute resolution procedures, see Deborah Hensler,
Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81
(2002).
37. Similar concerns have been raised about mediation of divorce and child
custody disputes. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dan-
gers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548 (1991).  Richard Delgado has discussed
the dangers of informal dispute resolution for people of color. See Richard Del-
gado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).  For empirical data suggesting
that Grillo’s and Delgado’s concerns may be warranted, see David Greatbatch &
Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on a Strat-
egy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 613 (1989), and Gary
LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender on
Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 767 (1996).
38. On the appropriateness of courts using mediation to resolve criminal
charges, see Albert Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: Concerning the Shortage
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Questions about the propriety of referring violations of public
law or denials of rights to private dispute resolution centers, and
concerns about the possibility that less powerful individuals might
be too easily manipulated by informal dispute resolvers, continue to
be raised within the context of the community justice movement.
But over time, some neighborhood justice centers grew and flour-
ished.  How they actually affected communities or the people they
served is largely unknown; there have been few empirical analyses
of their consequences.39  But neighborhood justice centers intro-
duced courts in many jurisdictions to the idea that alternative forms
of dispute resolution, offered privately outside the court system,
might assist courts in dealing with their own caseloads and serve
some disputants better than could the courts themselves.
IV. THE RISE OF COURT ADR:  RATIONALIZING COURT
SERVICES
As community justice centers were evolving outside the courts,
a new movement was evolving inside the courts.  To tell this part of
the story, I need to digress a bit to provide some background on
developments within United States courts.  Through most of our
history, American courts have not been tightly managed.  Judges
dealt with their assignments without much supervision from other
judges, and, in civil cases, many judges relegated control over case
development and case processing time to the lawyers.  This orienta-
tion towards court management seemed consistent with our party-
centered adversarial system, in which a judge’s role is primarily to
rule on issues that are presented to her by the parties’ lawyers.  Af-
ter World War II, this laissez-faire judicial system came increasingly
under attack.  Critics argued that courts needed to adopt a more
business-like approach to utilizing public resources, including judge
time.  A new field of court administration emerged that produced
professional “court administrators” to assist judges in managing
their calendars.  Courts also began to experiment with different ap-
proaches to preparing cases for trial and expediting resolution.40
Decreasing public expenditures for courts, combined with increas-
of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986).
39. The San Francisco community boards are the most prominent exception
to this observation; data on that program was assembled over a period of many
years, providing a basis for a comprehensive evaluation. See Shonholtz, supra note
31.
40. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY
(1984); STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (1977).
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ing case filings—civil cases in the federal courts more than doubled
from 1959 to 197641—fueled the “court management” revolution in
many jurisdictions.42
In 1976, leaders of the judiciary and the bar sponsored a con-
ference on the state of the justice system, modeled after a famous
turn-of-the-(last)century conference on “the causes of public dissat-
isfaction with the justice system.”43  Polling results presented at the
1976 conference indicated that most Americans knew very little
about the state of the justice system, but that those who had the
most experience—primarily as jury members, rather than as parties
to lawsuits—were least confident in the courts.  The poll did not
query people about their views of adversarial process, or about
their preferences for various types of dispute resolution, for exam-
ple mediation versus arbitration or trial.  But at the conference,
Professor Frank Sander of Harvard Law School gave a speech in
which he argued against a “one-size-fits-all” justice system, and in
favor of courts that would provide a variety of dispute resolution
techniques to citizens.44  Professor Sander’s speech, which was later
published, became the impetus for a movement to create what he
later called a “multi-door courthouse,” that would offer disputants
different forms of dispute resolution from which to choose.45  The
goal, Sander said in later talks, should be to “let the forum fit the
fuss.”
At the time of Sander’s speech, most civil lawsuits were al-
ready being resolved without trial.  In 1976, less than ten percent of
civil lawsuits filed in federal court reached trial and more than one-
third were resolved or dropped with no interaction with a judge at
all.46  Some urban state courts with large civil caseloads had been
encouraging lawyers to settle civil cases for decades, in an effort to
save the court and the parties time and money.47  In these courts,
judges would use conferences with attorneys that had been sched-
uled to discuss the attorneys’ trial plans as an opportunity to en-
41. TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF
CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 7 (1990).
42. WOLF HEYDERBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990).
43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
44. Sander, supra note 1.
45. Id.  See also Maurice Rosenberg, Let the Tribunal Fit the Case, Address
Before the American Association of Law Schools (Dec. 28, 1977), in 80 F.R.D. 147
(1977).
46. DUNGWORTH & PACE, supra note 41, at 29.
47. For example, Los Angeles had an active settlement program in the 1930s.
See MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A
HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1984).
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courage or facilitate settlement.  In some jurisdictions, such
conferences were mandatory.  But, in most jurisdictions, whether a
judge would engage in settlement discussions or not was left to indi-
vidual judges.  Some judges had local reputations as “good settlers,”
but just what they did in their meetings with the attorneys was un-
clear.  Anecdotal reports suggest that settlement judges helped at-
torneys (and indirectly, the attorneys’ clients) evaluate the likely
outcome if their case went to trial, and assisted the attorneys in
negotiating a compromise between offers and demands.  By evinc-
ing skepticism about the value of trying the case before them, some
judges also may have signaled that attorneys who resisted settling
would face obstacles at trial.  Today, some judges and practitioners
describe settlement conferences as “mediation,” but others view
them as a different form of conciliation, aimed at finding a compro-
mise between parties’ positions rather than finding an interest-
based resolution of parties’ disputes.48
Unless they significantly reduce the rate of trials, settlement
conferences can have little effect on the courts’ workload, which is
positively correlated with the proportion of cases that are tried.  In
1964, a groundbreaking empirical analysis was published showing
that judicial settlement conferences had no effect on trial rates,49 a
finding that was confirmed by later research.50  Nonetheless, judi-
cial settlement programs proliferated,51 and new judges were in-
48. The notion that such settlement is equivalent to mediation is an anathema
to many mediation practitioners and scholars. See, e.g., Kimberlee Kovach & Lela
Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERN. TO HIGH COST LITIG.
31 (1996). But see Joshua Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orien-
tations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (1997).
49. MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE
JUSTICE (1964).  Rosenberg’s work was one of the first empirical analyses of court
processes to adopt an experimental design that permitted the analysts to compare
the results of similar cases, some of which had been randomly assigned to a pretrial
conference and some of which had not. Id. The results showed no statistical dif-
ference in settlement rates between the two groups of cases. Id.
50. THOMAS CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION
IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978).
51. Just why settlement programs became so popular, given the lack of empir-
ical evidence of their effectiveness, is somewhat puzzling.  I suspect that when
judges observed cases settling after the judge had met with the attorneys—perhaps
even along the lines that the judge had suggested—it was hard for the judges not to
believe that they had played a role in the process.  That other cases in which the
judges had not intervened were settling at the same rate was less salient (and per-
haps even not known) to the judges.  Only an experimental design such as Rosen-
berg’s could test the hypothesis that settlement conferences increased settlement
rates, and there was then, as now, little understanding or use of such techniques in
the legal system.
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creasingly encouraged to settle cases and sometimes received
formal training in how to do so.52
Sander’s 1976 speech had provided a benign context for pro-
moting judicial settlement; it was simply one of a variety of ways to
resolve disputes, each of which might be more or less appropriate
for a particular lawsuit, depending on the circumstances.53  But as
more judges began to speak and write about their settlement ef-
forts, they drew the attention of legal scholars who viewed these
efforts more negatively.  These scholars worried not only that
judges’ neutrality could be compromised by their attempts to pro-
mote settlement,54 but that the settlement movement would disad-
vantage less powerful litigants, particularly minority group
members,55 and erode the public values inherent in formal adjudi-
cation.56  Rather than providing more options for disputants, the
critics saw Sander’s movement as transforming the very foundation
of the civil justice system.
The judicial settlement conference was not the only device
available to courts interested in implementing Sander’s vision.  In
the 1950s, Pennsylvania trial courts adopted an alternative to trial
for civil cases that did not involve judges at all.  Under this proce-
dure, which was first adopted in Philadelphia and later spread state-
wide, the court required civil disputants whose cases involved
modest amounts of money (but more money than a “small claims”
case) to attempt to resolve their disputes through an arbitration-
like process.  Cases would be referred to arbitration just a few
months after they were filed in court.
Court arbitration was not conceived as a conciliatory process.
Rather, it took the form of a streamlined adjudication, with relaxed
rules of evidence and a non-binding outcome.  Like judicial settle-
ment conferences, the purpose was to save the court and parties
time and money.  The parties’ lawyers would present their clients’
cases in a brief and informal hearing to a panel of three arbitrators.
52. For a description of the transformation of federal judging from adjudica-
tion to case management and dispute resolution, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV.
924 (2000).
53. See Sanders, supra note 1.
54. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
55. See Richard Delgado et al., supra note 37.
56. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); see also
Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 668 (1986); Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA.
L. REV. 405 (1987); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 212 (1995)
[hereinafter Resnik, Many Doors].
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The arbitrators were lawyers who had been appointed by the court
and who received a modest honorarium for their time, which was
paid from public funds.  At the arbitration hearing, the parties
themselves would usually testify, but they were not required to
bring other witnesses.  Instead, the lawyers would provide written
evidence—medical records, affidavits, etc.—to support their clients’
positions.  As a result, the hearings were usually very brief, less
than an hour on average.  After the hearing, the arbitrators would
immediately confer among themselves and reach a decision in favor
of the plaintiff or defendant; if they found for the plaintiff, they
would also decide damages.  The arbitrators delivered their deci-
sion in writing, but did not provide an explanation for it.  (Deliver-
ing a decision without findings of fact or law is traditional in binding
contractual arbitration, on which this non-binding process was
modeled.)
Arbitrators in Pennsylvania were expected to dispense “rough
justice.”  As one arbitrator interviewed in a study of Pittsburgh’s
court arbitration program said:  “Occasionally . . . I’ve heard a case
where the equities were clearly all on one side, but not necessarily
the law.  Then we [the arbitrators] might say:  ‘Let’s be fair here! If
anyone wants to appeal, the judge can be legal.’”57  Hence, court
arbitration—at least in this jurisdiction—might be regarded as a
form of “community justice,” in which the outcomes meted out con-
formed to informal norms.  But rather than the norms being articu-
lated and interpreted by community members, they were
interpreted by lawyers selected to serve as arbitrators by judges.
After they received the arbitrators’ decision, the parties had a
brief time to decide whether to accept it; if not, they would request
a trial, pay a modest fee to reimburse the court for the arbitrators’
honoraria, and the case would go back on the regular court calen-
dar.  A decision that was accepted was recorded formally and was
legally enforceable.  In Pittsburgh, litigants could complete this pro-
cess in less than six months.58  By comparison to judicial settlement
conferences, the process did not require as much judge time (be-
cause the arbitrators were lawyers rather than sitting judges), and it
did not raise concerns about judicial neutrality (because if a case
proceeded to trial after arbitration, the case would be tried de novo
and the judge would not be informed of the arbitrators’ decision).
By the 1970s, this method of dispute resolution—variously
termed “mandatory non-binding arbitration,” “court-annexed arbi-
57. JANE ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE 14 (1983).
58. Id.
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tration,” or, in California, “judicial arbitration”—had spread to
other states, and a few federal courts also tried it out.59  After
Sander’s speech at the Pound Conference, judges and lawyers be-
gan referring to these arbitration programs and judicial settlement
conferences as “alternative dispute resolution,” or “ADR.”
Jurisdictions that adopted mandatory non-binding arbitration
hoped to reduce the time required to resolve civil cases involving
smaller amounts of money.  By removing these cases from the
judges’ calendars, they also hoped to make judges more available
for deciding larger cases.  They expected that the net effect would
be to reduce the average costs and time required to process civil
lawsuits.  In other words, the objectives of court arbitration were
similar to the objectives of judicial settlement: saving time and
money.
However, researchers who conducted empirical studies of
court arbitration beginning in the 1980s found that the programs
were achieving something rather different from what the courts had
anticipated.  In most instances, the programs did not save time or
money.  To achieve such savings, the programs would have had to
divert cases from trial, the most expensive and time-consuming part
of the litigation process.  But most cases that participated in court
arbitration would have settled before trial.  Remember that by 1976
less than ten percent of civil cases in federal courts were being tried,
and even smaller percentages were reaching trial in many state
courts.  Rather than diverting cases from trial, what court arbitra-
tion was actually doing was providing a different means of settling a
case—a procedure that, unlike negotiation between the lawyers or
judge-run settlement conferences, included an evidentiary hearing
in which the parties participated.  Court-connected arbitration gen-
erally did not cut time to disposition because cases that would have
settled very early in the litigation process absent arbitration tended
to delay disposition until the hearing (or afterwards).  Court-con-
nected arbitration also generally did not save litigants money be-
cause lawyers tended to charge just about as much for resolving a
case with arbitration as they did for settling a case without arbitra-
tion, but in either event, the litigants were spared the cost and time
associated with trial.60
59. E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983).  The features of
court arbitration varied somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See ELIZA-
BETH ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: A POLICYMAKER’S
GUIDE (1984).
60. See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUA-
TION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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The researchers also discovered that parties whose cases were
arbitrated felt that they had been treated more fairly than parties
whose cases were resolved through simple lawyer-to-lawyer negoti-
ation or judicial settlement processes.61  To the litigants, arbitration
looked more like trial than settlement, and they preferred arbitra-
tion and trial to settlement.  The empirical research on perceived
fairness of court-connected arbitration confounded critics who had
opposed the institution of such programs as “second class justice”
intended for second-class citizens: individuals with small-value
claims.62  But the research findings were consistent with a long line
of psychological research—dubbed “procedural justice” or “proce-
dural fairness” research—exploring the bases for lay citizens’ as-
sessments of dispute resolution procedures.63
As research demonstrating that ordinary citizens felt good
about court arbitration programs mounted, state legislatures began
to authorize or mandate non-binding arbitration programs in some
or all of their courts.  Although there was no evidence that the pro-
(1990); Robert MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of Court Arbitration: A Cau-
tionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JUST. SYS. J. (1991).  For a review of the empirical
research on court-connected arbitration, see Deborah Hensler, Court-Ordered Ar-
bitration: An Alternative View, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 399 (1990).
61. E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’
VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCES (1989); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eyes of the Beholder: Tort Liti-
gants’ Evaluations of their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 953 (1990).
62. Diane Wood, Court Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 432, 435 (1990); Sharon A. Jennings, Note, Court-Annexed Arbitration
and Settlement Pressure: A Push Towards Efficient Dispute Resolution or “Second
Class” Justice?, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 313 (1991).
63. “Procedural justice” scholars have found that individuals use fairness
standards to evaluate both the outcomes of dispute resolution processes and the
procedures that yield those outcomes, and that they evaluate these two dimensions
separately.  Individuals who believe that both the process they encountered and
the outcomes they received were fair are most satisfied with dispute resolution
procedures, but those who believe the process was fair and the outcomes were
unfair are almost as satisfied.  (Such individuals may explain the outcomes as re-
sulting from honest errors or ignorance on the part of the third-party decision-
maker.)  A variety of explanations have been put forward to explain the power of
procedural justice in shaping assessments of dispute resolution, including the im-
portance to one’s self-esteem of being treated fairly by authoritative individuals
and institutions (the “relational” theory), and the possibility that lay individuals
use their assessment of process fairness to help them assess ambiguous outcomes
(the “fairness heuristic” theory). See, inter alia, E. ALLAN LIND & TOM TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Tom Tyler & E. Allan
Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMEN-
TAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (M. Zanna ed., 1992); K. Van de Bos et al., How Do I
Judge My Outcome When I Do Not Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology
of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1034 (1997).
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grams were saving courts or parties money, they did seem to pro-
vide something those parties valued—“a day in court”—at a price
that courts and parties could afford to pay.  Because court arbitra-
tors were essentially contributing their time pro bono, the costs to
hear cases were minimal.  In some jurisdictions, a large fraction of
cases that were arbitrated were resolved on the basis of the arbitra-
tors’ awards; in others, the awards mainly seem to have provided a
benchmark for settlements that occurred sometime after the hear-
ing.  By the mid-1980s, court arbitration looked like it was firmly
ensconced as a component of the multi-door courthouse.  About
half the states had adopted some form of court arbitration, and
about twenty federal district courts also had such programs.
A second piece of the multi-door courthouse that fell into
place during the 1980s was mediation of child custody cases.64  As
divorce rates increased, family counselors and other therapists
urged policy-makers to adopt conciliatory processes to decide child
custody.  Movies like Kramer v. Kramer65 that dramatized the nega-
tive effects on children of adversarial processes helped build sup-
port for family mediation.  Many states adopted policies that
required divorcing parents to meet with counselors to attempt to
work out financial and custody plans, which were then presented to
the court for approval.  In some jurisdictions, counselors would pro-
vide advisory opinions to the judges who presided over custody
cases.  Family mediation practitioners included counseling psychol-
ogists and lawyers in family practice who were drawn to less adver-
sarial approaches for resolving family disputes.
While some courts look to mediation to process child custody
cases more quickly and cheaply than the courts alone could do,
family law mediation programs do not seem to depend solely on
such efficiency claims for their existence.  This may be a good thing;
empirical research on family law mediation shows at best mixed re-
sults with regard to time and cost savings.66  But there is also re-
markably little research on whether the programs serve children
better—that is, whether the children of divorced parents are better
64. As I am not as familiar with the history of family law mediation as I am
with ADR procedures designed for civil money suits, I offer only a brief summary
here.  For an overview of the field, see DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 1988).
65. KRAMER V. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979).
66. For evidence that mediation costs about ten percent less than conven-
tional litigation, see Maryann Koch & Carol Lowery, Evaluation of Mediation as
an Alternative to Divorce Litigation, 15 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 109 (1984).
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off when custody disputes were mediated, rather than negotiated or
tried to a conclusion.67
During the 1980s, some courts adopted variations on mediation
and arbitration for special sub-sets of disputes, or offered a menu of
options that all disputants could choose among, including “mini-tri-
als,” “summary jury trials,” and “early neutral evaluation.”  By the
end of the 1980s, while only a few courts had formally adopted the
“multi-door” concept, many more seemed to be proceeding along
the path towards Sander’s objective.68
V.  THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY JOINS THE ADR MOVEMENT:
GETTING TO YES AND GETTING RID OF JURIES
During the 1980s, changes were also occurring in the business
community that would prove important to the evolution of dispute
resolution in the legal world.  Like the courts that had adopted judi-
cial settlement programs long before “ADR” became a buzzword,
American businesses had long experience with one particular alter-
native to court resolution: binding arbitration.  For decades, busi-
nesses had relied on arbitration to resolve certain classes of
disputes.  By including an arbitration clause in a business contract,
manufacturers, suppliers, and buyers could establish the rules by
which disputes among themselves would be decided, could select
who would decide the suits, and could ensure that the outcomes of
a dispute resolution would be binding—and generally not subject to
appeal.  This form of dispute resolution was particularly attractive
to sectors of industry, such as the diamond industry, in which spe-
cial business norms that businesses preferred to prevailing legal
67. But see Muriel Brotsky et al., Joint Custody Through Mediation: A Longi-
tudinal Assessment of the Children, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 1988); Peter Dillon & Robert Emery, Divorce
Mediation and Resolution of Child Custody Disputes: Long-term Effects, 66 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 131 (1996); Katherine Kitzmann & Robert Emery, Child and
Family Coping One Year After Mediated and Litigated Child Custody Disputes, 8 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 150 (1994); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation
Results, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Jay Folberg et al. eds.,
1988). Although the attractions of mediating child custody disputes seem over-
whelmingly obvious to many, family law mediation programs have attracted criti-
cism from feminists who fear that women will find it harder than men to assert
their rights in informal, conciliatory sessions. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 37.
68. On the spread of court-mandated ADR, see Lucy Katz, Compulsory Dis-
pute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?,
1993 J. OF DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in
an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Resnik, Many Doors, supra note 56; Edward F.
Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Partici-
pation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079 (1993).
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norms had evolved over time,69 and sectors, such as the construc-
tion industry, in which many conflicts implicated technical judg-
ment, so that specialist decision makers were preferable to
generalist judges.  Businesses could turn to a myriad of organiza-
tions for administration of arbitration, referrals to arbitrators, and
rule drafting.
By the 1980s, tens of thousands of disputes were being arbi-
trated annually.  But many business decision makers were critical of
arbitration.  Some complained that arbitrating disputes took just as
long and cost just as much as it would have if these disputes had
been taken to court.  They said that lawyers were simply importing
the same practices that they had learned for litigation, including dis-
covery, to the arbitration forum.  Other critics complained that ar-
bitrators were too prone to reach “split the baby” decisions—to
compromise outcomes—rather than to decide disputes on the mer-
its.  These complaints were persistent, but not new.  No one actually
had done any empirical research on the outcomes of binding arbi-
tration (outside the labor management field), so no one was certain
if and when arbitration was beneficial vis-a`-vis court resolution.
But one thing that was clear was that arbitration produced dis-
tributive outcomes, that is decisions that declared one person the
“loser” and the other the “victor” on some or all points in dispute.70
A new book, published in 1981, urged business decision makers,
lawyers, and others to look beyond distributive bargaining to find
“win-win” resolutions that would better serve all parties to dis-
putes.71  The authors argued that “interest-based” or “integrative”
negotiation not only had the potential to maximize the joint gains
to disputants from resolving their disagreements, but also held out
more hope of preserving the relationship between the parties than
would a hard-fought adversarial battle.72
Of course, I am talking about Roger Fisher and William Ury’s
book, Getting to Yes.73  Fisher and Ury’s book dealt with negotia-
tion, but it provided a framework for mediating disputes that was
69. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con-
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
70. For a discussion of distributive resolution of legal disputes, see Robert
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
71. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
72. For a discussion of integrative negotiation of legal disputes, see ROBERT
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS
AND DISPUTES (2000).
73. FISHER & URY, supra note 71.
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soon taken up by the business community.74  Like the Pennsylvania
court arbitrators, mediation advocates in the business community
had something in common with the community justice advocates of
the 1970s and with the utopian Nationalists of the early twentieth
century.  Among their goals were the substitution of practical prob-
lem-solving norms—that is, “grassroots” business beliefs—for for-
mal legal norms, and transferring power over dispute resolution
from lawyers to business people themselves.  Stories about how
business decision makers seized the dispute resolution initiative
from their lawyers and reached “win-win” solutions that led to new
joint business ventures were centerpieces of business writing about
dispute resolution in the 1980s.75
Business decision makers and their advisors also urged their
lawyers to make more use of mediation in resolving legal disputes.
Mediation increasingly appeared on the agenda of business litiga-
tion conferences; some lawyers began to advertise their services as
mediators in complex business disputes.  Mediation training, of-
fered by non-lawyers and lawyers, became more widely available.
Some lawyers began to draft contract clauses that called for media-
tion instead of or in addition to arbitration.76  The American Arbi-
tration Association, the oldest and most consistent proponent of
arbitrating disputes, began to offer mediation as an alternative to its
traditional fare.
Enthusiasm for mediation may have been spurred as well by a
series of federal and state court decisions handed down during the
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., James F. Henry, Built-in Protection Against Litigation Blues,
WALL ST. J., July 22, 1991, at A8.
76. Because there are no comprehensive statistics on cases that use alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms in the private sector, the relative popularity of
arbitration and mediation is currently unknown.  A 1990s RAND Institute for
Civil Justice study of the private ADR market in Los Angeles County found that
fifty-eight percent of disputes processed by private ADR providers were arbi-
trated, twenty-two percent were mediated and the remainder were handled with a
mix of “private judging” and what the authors termed “voluntary settlement con-
ferences.” See ELIZABETH ROLPH ET AL., ESCAPING THE COURTHOUSE: PRIVATE
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LOS ANGELES (1994).  A survey of 528
Fortune 1000 corporations conducted in 1996 by the Cornell/PERC Institute on
Conflict Resolution found that seventy-eight percent reported having used arbitra-
tion and eighty-seven percent reported having used mediation; more than sixty
percent said they generally included mediation clauses in contracts, while eighty-
two percent said they included arbitration clauses. See Thomas Donahue & Bar-
bara Reinhardt, Survey: ADR Use Increasing, 15 ALTERN. HIGH COSTS OF LITIG.
66, 75 (1997). See also, Gregory Higgins & William O’Connell, Mediation, Arbitra-
tion Square Off, NAT’L L. J., March 24, 1997, at B18 (suggesting that “smaller
dollar” disputes are more amenable to mediation than “larger, more complex”
matters “over which no party is willing to compromise”).
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1990s that significantly increased the risks of arbitration for liti-
gants.77  Prior to these decisions, parties who were unhappy with
their agreement to arbitrate or with the outcomes of an arbitration
proceeding had some room for wriggling out of the agreement or
challenging an outcome.  Subsequently, arbitration agreements
were more rigidly enforceable.  Attempting to work out a mutually
agreeable resolution of a dispute with the help of a mediator, with
recourse to the court in the case of failure, seemed more attractive
to many business decision makers and their lawyers than this more
rigid interpretation of arbitration.  “Finality,” often cited as binding
arbitration’s most attractive feature, looked less attractive when an
outcome could not be challenged except in rare circumstances of
outright corruption.
Businesses did not turn away from arbitration entirely, how-
ever.  In many sectors where arbitration has long been the norm, it
continues to be the norm today.  Moreover, businesses have enthu-
siastically embraced arbitration for disputes between them and indi-
vidual consumers and between management and its employees—a
move that was also authorized by the court decisions of the 1980s
and 1990s.78  Today, an increasing number of consumer transactions
and workplace disputes are governed by arbitration agreements
that require consumers and workers to waive their rights to a legal
remedy if a dispute arises as the result of the transaction.79  These
agreements, according to whose terms consumers may have little
influence over arbitrator selection or arbitration rules, are generat-
ing increasing controversy.  One does not have to be too much of a
cynic to believe that at least some business decisions to impose
binding arbitration have been driven not simply by desires to re-
duce the time and costs associated with conflicts, but also by desires
to maximize desirable outcomes for the business—the drafting
77. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (Cal. 1994);
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase´, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992); Lee v. Tech. Integration
Group, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Moore v. First Bank of San Luis
Obispo, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Amgen, Inc. v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 708 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). But see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens
& Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Prudential v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
78. Katherine Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996);
Katherine Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).
79. See Linda Demaine & Deborah Hensler, Consumer Arbitration Contracts:
What the “Average Joe” Knows About His Choices, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2003).
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party.  Whatever else arbitration contracts achieve, they preclude
plaintiffs from taking cases to juries, which many business decision
makers believe are prejudiced against them.  Moreover, some con-
sumer contract clauses now require consumers to waive their right
to become a party to a class action, as well as to bring individual
litigation.  Forestalling class litigation in many instances is tanta-
mount to eliminating disputes altogether.
VI. MEDIATION OF CIVIL MONEY LAWSUITS MOVES INTO THE
COURTS
During the 1990s, courts seeking methods for reducing trial
court caseloads and speeding civil case disposition turned increas-
ingly to mediation, viewing it not just as a technique for resolving
child custody disputes, but as an approach to resolving all kinds of
civil lawsuits over money.  The generally positive reception ac-
corded non-binding arbitration programs may have encouraged
courts to pursue other dispute resolution alternatives.  Moreover, as
some courts recognized that non-binding arbitration was not pro-
ducing the sort of caseload reduction they had hoped for, it made
sense to explore other possible alternatives.
Courts’ attention was drawn to mediation by business defend-
ants (who are well represented on bench and bar committees), by
commercial litigators who had acquired experience with mediation,
and by lawyers who had been trained as mediators and were look-
ing for new domains in which to market their skills.  As had been
the case with neighborhood justice centers, some newly trained
mediators were finding it difficult to identify enough dispute busi-
ness to support their practices, and also like the neighborhood jus-
tice centers, they saw the courts as a source of referrals.
As had been true with court arbitration, court mediation was
promoted as a means of reducing time and costs to resolve civil
disputes.80  Many mediation advocates were not familiar with the
empirical studies that had found little support for the proposition
that court arbitration saves time or money.  But those aware of the
studies were persuaded that mediation would produce more signifi-
cant consequences, because it offered something fundamentally dif-
ferent to litigants—that is, the possibility of an integrative
resolution of their conflict.  (Recall that court arbitration, like bind-
80. For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 urged courts to adopt
alternative dispute resolution as one of the means to reducing costs and time to
disposition of civil cases in the federal court. See JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., JUST,
SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1997).
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ing arbitration, is intended to deliver a “win-lose” distributive
outcome.)
By the mid-1990s, more than half of state courts, and virtually
all of the federal district courts, had adopted mediation programs
for large categories of civil suits.81  Because many courts had ob-
served that disputants would not engage in other forms of court
ADR voluntarily, some courts required parties to mediate their dis-
putes—over the objections of some mediators who protested that
volunteering was essential to mediation.  As was the case with
mandatory non-binding court arbitration, courts permitted litigants
who could not reach a mutually acceptable resolution of their dis-
pute through mediation to return their cases to the regular trial
calendar.
Although courts embraced mediation out of the same concerns
that had earlier led them to adopt non-binding arbitration pro-
grams, there were some important differences between mediation
and arbitration rules and practices.  Whereas many jurisdictions had
restricted the use of non-binding court arbitration to suits over
small amounts of money, many mediation programs applied to a
broad range of civil lawsuits, including lawsuits for large amounts of
money and over complex matters, such as medical malpractice.
Many court arbitration program rules required that the court (a
judge or bench-and-bar committee) appoint arbitrators with signifi-
cant experience or specialized expertise to a panel from which
judges would assign arbitrators randomly to cases, or from which
parties could choose one or a few arbitrators to resolve their dis-
pute.  But courts’ mediation rules generally did not require the
courts to vet mediators’ experience or expertise, and judges gener-
ally left selection of mediators entirely to the parties’ lawyers.82
Some states do certify mediators who have completed a re-
quired number of training hours; in other jurisdictions, courts may
publish rosters of lawyers who have indicated an interest in mediat-
ing.  In either case, parties are not bound to use these mediators.83
81. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLE-
MENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAW-
YERS (1996).
82. However, there are anecdotal reports that some judges in some jurisdic-
tions do direct attorneys and their clients to particular mediation services. Such a
practice may present a conflict of interest if the judge is nearing retirement and
contemplating joining that mediation provider.
83. The State of Florida, which has one of the most comprehensive mediation
statutes in the country, provides, by court rule, for training and certification of
mediators.  The Florida Supreme Court publishes a list of certified circuit court
(trial court of general jurisdiction) mediators, and has appointed a Mediation
Training Review Board, charged with enforcing standards. See FLA. DISPUTE
372 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:349
Most legislatively adopted court arbitration programs establish usu-
ally modest fees for arbitrators, which in some jurisdictions are paid
out of public funds and in others are split by the parties.  Mediators
who mediate cases in court mediation programs usually are free to
set their own fees, which are constrained by the market and are
generally considerably higher, on a per case basis, than arbitrators’
fees in the same markets.84  Perhaps because court arbitrators need
to meet selection criteria or because they could earn at best modest
honoraria, most court arbitrators are lawyers who arbitrate a few
cases a year and consider their participation in the arbitration pro-
gram a professional responsibility.  In contrast, most court
mediators are lawyers or retired judges, many of whom hope that
mediation programs will provide sufficient numbers of cases to gen-
erate significant income.
The rules governing arbitration and mediation processes and
outcomes differ as well.  Court arbitration programs yield outcomes
that become enforceable judgments if the parties accept them and,
unless sealed, are open to public scrutiny.  Mediation programs
yield outcomes that are private settlements, reached in private
meetings.  In many jurisdictions, the parties, lawyers, and mediators
are bound by law to keep whatever transpired during the mediation
confidential.  No special confidential provisions pertain to court ar-
bitration programs; parties are free to discuss witnesses’ testimony,
material entered into evidence, arbitrators’ demeanor and manage-
ment of the process, and the ultimate outcomes.
Over time, court arbitration programs have withered away, and
today mediation, on a voluntary or mandatory basis, dominates the
“multi-door courthouse.”85  The consequence of the widespread
adoption by legislatures and court rule of civil case mediation has
been the development and growth of a new and largely unregulated
industry that operates—by design—behind closed doors.  That par-
ties should be free, in most circumstances, to negotiate privately
and to keep any agreements reached confidential is neither a new
concept nor does it pertain solely to mediation.  As I have dis-
cussed, one of the attractions of traditional contract-based arbitra-
tion is privacy, and courts in the past couple of decades have
RESOL. CENTER, FLORIDA MEDIATION/ARBITRATION PROGRAMS: A COMPEN-
DIUM (1995); FLA. DISPUTE RESOL. CENTER, THE RESOLUTION REPORT (1996).
84. But in some jurisdictions, courts expect practitioners to serve as court
mediators pro bono.  See, e.g., CAL. ST. TRIAL CT. r. 1640.3(d) (“In courts author-
ized to make voluntary referrals to mediation, as a condition for inclusion on the
court’s panel, each court shall require that mediators agree to serve on a pro bono
or reduced-fee basis in at least one case per year, if requested by the court.”).
85. See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 81.
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rigorously protected parties’ rights to contract for arbitration.  But
the notion that courts might order parties—as a condition for seek-
ing access to the courtroom—to use a private process, run by pri-
vate providers, in circumstances that impede public scrutiny is new.
I hasten to say that I do not believe there is a deep plot here to
deprive people of procedural rights.  Most of the differences be-
tween court arbitration and court mediation programs appear to be
happenstance.  Legislatures that adopt ADR programs by statute
rarely engage in a close comparison of their features, uses, or conse-
quences.  Indeed, some legislators (and many lawyers) have only
the haziest of notions about the differences among ADR proce-
dures.86  But other factors may have played a role as well.  As I
have discussed, court arbitration programs were often adopted in
the face of opposition from critics who feared they would provide
“second class justice.”87  Perhaps as a result, courts maintained con-
siderable control over arbitrator selection and practice.  In contrast,
most mediation programs have met with little opposition.  Media-
tion and other conciliatory techniques are widely perceived to be
“good”—by comparison with litigation.  And it is understood that if
the parties cannot agree on a resolution in mediation, they can re-
turn to the court.  (Of course, that is also true of court arbitration
programs, which are non-binding in every jurisdiction that adopted
them.)  Perhaps as a result, legislatures and courts do not feel that
they need to regulate mediation or mediators closely.
Much is still to be learned about these new court mediation
programs.  The evidence to date indicates that they, like the earlier
judicial settlement and arbitration programs, produce little in the
way of time or cost savings.88  We know virtually nothing about the
outcomes of mediation programs, about whether they change the
distribution of power between the “haves” and “have nots.”89  We
86. For an example of the tendency—even among noted scholars—to lump all
ADR procedures together, see Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 62.
88. See, e.g., JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND
EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1997).
For a review of empirical research on court mediation of civil money disputes, see
Deborah Hensler, In Search of “Good Mediation”: Rhetoric, Practice, and Empiri-
cism, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee
Hamilton eds., 2000).
89. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  Some empirical data
suggests that minority group members fare less well in mediation than white non-
Hispanic parties, even when the mediator is herself a minority group member. See
LaFree & Rack, supra note 37.  But whether the difference in outcomes observed
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have no idea whether mediation helps to open the courts to dispu-
tants of lesser means or those with “less important” claims, whether
it has the effect of shunting them aside, or whether court mediation
programs have no effect on access to courts at all.  As with arbitra-
tion programs, litigants appear to be quite satisfied with court medi-
ation.  But we have yet to see the kind of detailed analysis of
individuals’ assessments of the procedural features of mediation
that has been performed for court arbitration.  The assumption of
practitioners and scholars alike is that litigants’ perceptions of the
fairness of mediation procedures are at least as positive—practi-
tioners might argue more positive—as their perceptions of the fair-
ness of court arbitration.90  But this hypothesis has yet to be tested
either in the laboratory or in the field.  And evidence from prior
studies that litigants prefer trial and court arbitration to judicial set-
tlement conferences91 suggests that the assumption of a general
preference for mediation over adjudication may prove wrong.92
VII. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIATION: TRANSFORMATION
AND TRANSCENDENCE
As mediation’s popularity grew outside and within the court,
so did debate within the practitioner community about what media-
tion really is.93  Some practitioners saw the term as capacious
enough to include all forms of third-party assistance in resolving
disputes, including having a neutral “evaluate” what the likely out-
come of the case would be at trial (which could then serve as a basis
for negotiating a settlement).  For example, an evaluative mediator
for mediation is different from the difference that might be observed for tradi-
tional litigation is unknown.
90. Recall that litigants’ perceptions of the fairness of court arbitration proce-
dures are virtually undistinguishable from their perceptions of the fairness of trials,
both of which are regarded as very fair. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eyes of the
Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of their Experiences in the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990).
91. Id.
92. For a discussion of psychological research on dispute resolution procedu-
ral preferences, see Hensler, supra note 36.
93. The early social science literature on mediation is replete with analytic
typologies for sorting mediator styles and tactics. See, e.g., DEBORAH KOLB, THE
MEDIATORS (1983) (distinguishing “orchestrators” and “deal makers” among la-
bor mediators); Kenneth Kressel & Dean Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social
Conflict, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 179, 188-95 (1983) (proposing a two-dimensional grid
for sorting mediators by their degree of assertiveness and the distribution of their
“interventions” into “reflexive” (self-referential), “contextual” (relational), and
“substantive” (outcome-oriented) categories); Debra Shapiro et al., Mediator Be-
havior and the Outcome of Mediation, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 101, 109 (1983) (finding
labor mediators’ styles can be distinguished as “deal making” versus “shuttle diplo-
macy,” and that most mediators adopt styles tailored for the dispute at hand).
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(like a settlement judge) might suggest that an acceptable resolu-
tion of a lawsuit would lie within a monetary range dictated by the
(perceived) relative strength (legally and factually) of the parties’
claims.  Other practitioners argued that the only “true” form of me-
diation is “facilitative” mediation.94  A facilitative mediator would
help disputants search for a resolution that reflected their underly-
ing interests and maximized joint gains.  A facilitative mediator
would not suggest what the resolution ought to be.  But a facilita-
tive mediator might suggest that the parties should put aside no-
tions of legal rights and remedies (“rights talk”) and re-
conceptualize their dispute as a problem that would be best to solve
and then move on.
Then, in 1994 a book appeared that set off a new round of de-
bate about the proper objectives of mediation, and the proper role
of mediators.  In The Promise of Mediation, authors Robert Baruch
Bush and Joseph Folger argued that the true purpose of mediation
is to help individuals gain a better understanding of each other and
themselves.95  Mediation, they wrote, should be neither evaluative
nor facilitative, but rather “transformative.”96  Whether or not the
dispute that brings parties together with a mediator is resolved is
less important than the individuals’ gaining new understanding, new
skills for dealing with problems that may arise in the future, and an
enhanced sense of control over their lives.  In its emphasis on em-
powerment, transformative mediation echoes the credo of commu-
nity justice advocates of the 1960s and 1970s.  But the new ideology
is centered on self-empowerment, rather than on group empower-
ment.  Disputants learn to take control of their lives, not control of
society.97
Among the many unexplored aspects of mediation is the moti-
vation of those who have flocked so eagerly to its practice.  Clearly,
many of the lawyers who have moved into the field are searching
for a new revenue-producing line of practice.98  But others are at-
94. For an overview of this debate, see Leonard Riskin, Understanding
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); Leonard Riskin, Mediation Quandaries, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1007 (1997); Stulberg, supra note 48.
95. ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA-
TION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(1994).
96. Id.
97. Transformative mediation also shares the therapeutic perspective that
characterizes some forms of family mediation.
98. Indeed, if mediation did reduce legal fees and thereby reduced revenues
from client representation, this might provide an incentive for litigators who exper-
ienced such losses to seek out new lines of practice.
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tracted by the promises mediation holds out for particular clients
and particular types of disputes.  Business lawyers are attracted by
the “problem-solving” perspective of mediation, which many be-
lieve is particularly well suited to contract disputes.  Family law spe-
cialists believe mediation is more likely to help preserve
relationships between divorcing parents that are important to chil-
dren’s future welfare.  Still others see mediation as especially help-
ful in resolving the complex, multi-dimensional, multi-party
conflicts that are characteristic of environmental and land use dis-
putes, and in designing forward-looking remedies in class actions
aimed at institutional reform.  Over time, lawyers appear to have
become increasingly positive about the use of mediation to resolve
lawsuits.99
Whatever their specialties, some lawyers see in mediation an
opportunity to do something that they themselves find more person-
ally fulfilling than litigation.  Seemingly, for some lawyers, media-
tion is a transformative experience.  Some mediators talk about the
“magic” of resolving disputes.  Others talk of their experience much
as athletes do, saying they have a feeling of being “in the zone”
when a mediation session is progressing satisfactorily.  Still others
talk of the connection between mediation and spirituality.100  Some
mediation education programs include sessions on “mindfulness”
and meditation.101  A recent meeting of the Northern California
Association for Dispute Resolution featured a presentation on
99. See John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137 (2000); Julie Macfarlane, Cul-
ture Change?  A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation,
2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241 (2002).
100. Among the many sections of the Association for Conflict Resolution
(“ACR”) is the section on Spirituality, which describes itself as “the vessel to hold
the exploration of how our own spirituality, different spiritual philosophies and
many spiritual practices support and enhance who we are as mediators.” See Spiri-
tuality, at http://www.acresolution.org/research.nsf/1b16ae2e0ce7b8d285256a38006
6a51a/e9f3d4b3569f504985256a5700528d7f!OpenDocument (last visited July 1,
2003).  The ACR was formed by the merger of the Academy of Family Mediators
(“AFM”), the Conflict Resolution Education Network (“CRENet”), and the Soci-
ety for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (“SPIDR”).
101. See ACR Annual Conference 2001, Mindfulness and the Presence, at
http://www.acresolution.org/acr.nsf/SessionsWeb/C5E0782186917FAF85256AFF00
744482 (last visited July 1, 2003); Leonard Riskin, Enlarging the Canon: Mindful-
ness in Dispute Resolution, Workshop at the Association of American Law
Schools Annual Conference (2003), at http://www.aals.org/am2003/riskin.html (last
visited July 1, 2003). See also, Tuan Pham, The Zen of Mediation, 11 RESOL.: Q.
UPDATE ON DISP. RESOL. (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/
drs/resolutions/march2003/zen.html (last visited July 1, 2003) (describing author’s
“Zen workshop for mediators,” and noting that “[m]editation and mediation are
both instruments of peacemaking.”).  Mr. Pham describes himself as a “dedicated
Dharma practitioner, an experienced civil and family mediator, and a certified
2017] OUR COURTS, OURSELVES 377
Aikido for mediators, offering techniques for “increasing [the medi-
ator’s] presence during mediation” and “learn[ing] to ground and
center under stress during a mediation.”102  The speaker’s presenta-
tion was based on her theory of “conscious embodiment.”103  With
the growing popularity among mediators of what some have termed
the “New Sciences,” one author has suggested we have entered a
new era of “transcendent mediation.”104  The links between spiritu-
ality and mediation, between a heightened sense of self and the fa-
cilitation of social harmony, evoke memories of the Theosophist
movement of the early 1900s.
Just what kinds of mediation are being practiced currently in
court-related programs is uncertain.  Some state and federal court
mediation programs train mediators to facilitate disputes and to es-
chew evaluation altogether.105  To my knowledge, no court system
requires transformative mediation.106  But seemingly some courts
are comfortable disseminating information on—if not promoting—
the idea of transcendental mediation.107
There are only a few studies that report empirical observations
of what happens during court mediation.  These studies found that
parties were generally little involved in mediation—in some pro-
grams, parties rarely participated—and that mediators rarely en-
couraged integrative negotiation (much less transformative
mediation).  In the courts studied, mediation most resembled tradi-
training specialist.” Id. The newsletter in which his article appeared is published
by the Department of Dispute Resolution Services of the Virginia State Courts.
102. Email from Adrnc.org, to Conference Participants (June 3, 2003) (on file
with author).  The speaker at the program was Wendy Palmer, author of The Prac-
tice of Freedom and The Intuitive Body.
103. Id.
104. See Tom Fisher, Exploring Mindfulness in Mediation, available at http://
www.leadr.com.au/FISHER.PDF (last visited July 1, 2003). See also KABAT-ZINN
J. HYPERION, WHEREVER YOU GO THERE YOU ARE: MINDFULNESS MEDIATION
IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1995).
105. For example, two of the four mediation programs that RAND studied in
its evaluation of ADR programs established under the Civil Justice Reform Act
trained mediators to be facilitative. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 80.  Florida’s
Standards of Professional Conduct emphasize the facilitative nature of the media-
tion process. See FLA. ST. MEDIATOR CONDUCT R. 10.210, 10.220, 10.300, 10.310.
106. The U.S. Post Office recently adopted an agency-wide mediation pro-
gram for workplace disputes that relies exclusively on the transformative model;
the leaders of that program recently left the postal service to establish a mediation
service that uses the transformative model. See Jonathan Anderson & Lisa Bing-
ham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of Workplace Disputes: Some Preliminary
Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601 (1997); Lisa Bingham, Mediating Em-
ployment Disputes: Perceptions of Redress at the United States Postal Service, 17
REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 20 (1997).
107. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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tional judicial settlement conferences, with a privately selected and
privately paid mediator substituting for a publicly paid and publicly
selected judge.108  Anecdotal evidence suggests that rather than
changing the conceptualization of a lawsuit or the definition of a
good settlement, most mediators focus on helping parties overcome
the barriers to negotiating settlements within the shadow of the law.
In sum, there may be less going on here than meets the eye; rather
than fundamentally transforming the dispute resolution process
mediators may simply—but importantly—be helping lawyers to ne-
gotiate more effectively.
Perhaps lawyers, despite their rhetorical support for interest-
based or transformative mediation, will wrestle the new procedures
back into a shape that they recognize: fact and law based contests
between parties seeking authoritative decisions, or negotiated out-
comes reached in the shadow of those decisions.  The anecdotal re-
ports that evaluative mediation is the form of mediation that has
taken firmest hold in the courts seem to be straws blowing in that
direction.  But if court mediation is just old wine in new bottles,
then we ought to be questioning why courts are requiring litigants
to engage in a private fee-for-service process that substitutes what
once was available to all for a simple filing fee.109  We might also
ask why lawyers—who used to be able to negotiate settlements
most of the time without a third party—now so often require the
assistance of a mediator (at an additional cost to their clients) to
resolve their cases.110
Ironically, the ADR movement ultimately may be more suc-
cessful at transforming courts than transforming lawyers or dispu-
tants.  Recent court decisions suggest that at least some jurists have
embraced a new vision of the objectives of the justice system, a vi-
108. See Hensler, supra note 88. See also Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change?
A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP.
RESOL. 241 (2002); Nancy Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179
(2002).
109. It is also a process that used to be provided at no additional charge by
judges and (in some jurisdictions) by lawyers serving pro bono; another approach
to settlement that pre-dates the ADR movement is “settlement week,” when law-
yers volunteered to help other lawyers with cases that had stacked-up on court
calendars. See Deborah Hensler, Court-Annexed ADR, in ADR PRACTICE BOOK
(John Wilkinson ed., 1990).
110. A striking number of lawyers who practice in different parts of the coun-
try have shared with me their bemusement that cases that they used to negotiate
with opposing counsel now go directly to mediation (even when it is not required
by the court) without discussion as to whether it is necessary or appropriate.  None
of these lawyers opposes mediation—they are just surprised to find themselves in
this position.
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sion in which the purpose of legal dispute resolution is to achieve
social harmony, rather than to assess factual and legal claims and
articulate public norms.  In Neary v. Regents of the University of
California, upholding vacatur of a trial court judgment that had
been stipulated as a condition of settlement negotiated by the par-
ties post-trial, the California Supreme Court held:
The primary purpose of the public judiciary is ‘to afford a forum
for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties
[citation omitted].  We do not resolve abstract legal issues, even
when requested to do so.  We resolve real disputes between real
people.  This function does not undermine our integrity or de-
mean our function.  By providing a forum for the peaceful resolu-
tion of citizens’ disputes, we provide a cornerstone for ordered
liberty in a democratic society.
The Court of Appeal’s concern for the integrity of trial court
judgments is flawed . . . . The notion that such judgment is a
statement of ‘legal truth’ places too much emphasis on the result
of litigation rather than its purpose . . . . The paramount purpose
of litigation is to resolve disputes.  If that goal is achieved, even
after judgment, the trial court’s essential function has been
fulfilled . . . .
[T]he public interest itself is served by the peaceful settlement of
disputes and unclogging of court dockets.111
There is little evidence that jurists who have embraced these
new visions of the courts have carefully considered their institu-
111. Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 864, 865 (Cal.
1992).  In dissent, Justice Kennard responded:
More than just a dispute resolution service, the judiciary is an integral
part of our government.  Working in the context of actual disputes, courts
interpret and enforce the policies adopted by the legislative process, striv-
ing always to give those policies coherence and vitality.  Thus, when a
trial court renders judgment in a particular case, it is not just deciding
who wins and who loses, who pays and who recovers.  Rather, the ulti-
mate purpose of a judgment is to administer the laws of this state, and
thereby to do substantial justice.
Id.
Justice Anthony Kline refused to apply the Neary precedent in a subsequent
case, on the grounds that “the doctrine of stipulated reversal announced in Neary
is destructive of judicial institutions.” Morrow v. Hood Communications, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 489, 491 (Cal. 1997).  The California legislature subsequently overturned
the Neary holding with regard to stipulated reversals of judgment. See In re
Rashad H., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting amendment of Cali-
fornia Rules of Civil Procedure overrules Morrow).  For comment on stipulated
reversals, see Jill Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Deci-
sion Law Through Settlement Conditioned Upon the Vacatur of Entered Judgments,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 589 (1991); Resnik, Many Doors, supra note 56.
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tional implications.  Should generalist judges lead courts dedicated
to social harmony, problem solving and self-understanding?  Or
would such courts be better led by communication experts, risk
management specialists, and counseling psychologists?  What role
should the public play in selecting the experts who will shape the
new dispute resolution process?  Can a justice system dedicated to
conciliation rather than adjudication of facts and law maintain its
status as a third branch of government, equal to the legislature and
executive?  Whatever their failures in achieving efficient and fair
justice for citizens, the core competence of today’s courts is adjudi-
cation.  Re-imagining the purpose of courts requires re-thinking
their institutional structure as well.
VIII.  OUR COURTS, OURSELVES?
Just where we are in the story of the alternative dispute resolu-
tion movement—whether we are nearing the concluding chapter or
still in mid-narrative, with many turns in the plot line still to come—
is not clear.  But some parts of the story seem clear.  There is little
evidence that neighborhood justice centers have substantially re-
duced urban social conflict or contributed to a significant redistri-
bution of power within communities, although they may well be
helping neighbors work out minor disputes.  There is little evidence
that alternative dispute resolution procedures within courts have re-
duced the average time to dispose of civil lawsuits, or the average
public or private expense to litigate cases in a system that has long
relied on settlement rather than adjudication to resolve most cases.
There is also little evidence that alternative dispute resolution pro-
cedures outside of courts have reduced the transaction costs of
resolving conflicts that would never have gone to trial anyway, al-
though they may be contributing to a drop in civil case filings.  By
precluding jury trial, private binding arbitration may well have de-
creased the expected value of a dispute outcome, but any savings
accruing from this may be outweighed by an increase in claiming, if
arbitration simplifies the dispute process for ordinary consumers or
employees.  Whether alternative dispute resolution processes
outside or within courts have significantly increased the preexisting
imbalance of power between the “haves” and “have nots” is un-
clear.  While there are reasons to believe that ADR sometimes dis-
advantages the less powerful, the traditional litigation process may
not do much better in creating a level playing field.
If lawyers succeed in shaping alternative dispute resolution
procedures to comport with traditional notions of settlement, the
immediate outcomes of the dispute resolution movement may sim-
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ply be to increase the costs of litigation by substituting paid lawyer-
settlers for publicly subsidized judge-settlers.  The story of the alter-
native dispute resolution movement might then appear to be just a
very old tale, retold.
But I find it hard to believe that the myriad new statutes and
court rules promoting or mandating private dispute resolution, the
thousands of mediator training sessions, promotional videotapes,
and educational programs, and the public rhetoric that has accom-
panied all of these will have so little long-term consequence.  To
encourage people to consider alternatives to litigation, in federal
and state courts nationwide, judges and mediators are telling claim-
ants that legal norms are antithetical to their interests, that vindicat-
ing their legal rights is antithetical to social harmony, that juries are
capricious, that judges cannot be relied upon to apply the law prop-
erly, and that it is better to seek inner peace than social change.  To
drive these messages home, courts and legislatures mandate media-
tion, preclude dissemination of information about what transpires
during mediation sessions, and—in the case of binding arbitra-
tion—sharply limit the ability of claimants to challenge the process
or outcome.  Moreover, both legislatures and courts display a
breezy indifference to the qualifications of those who act as third-
party neutrals and to the costs imposed on litigants by alternative
dispute resolution mandates—all apparently based on the belief
that any alternative to adversarial conflict must be beneficial.
Looking backwards, we may well come to view the dispute res-
olution movement as contributing to—if not creating—a profound
change in our view of the justice system.  With increasing barriers to
litigating, fewer citizens will find their own way into court (although
they may be brought there to answer criminal charges).  Those who
are not barred from using the courts by contractual agreement will
increasingly find themselves shepherded outside the courthouse to
confidential conferences presided over by private neutrals in pri-
vate venues.  With little experience of public adjudication and little
information available about the process or outcomes of dispute res-
olution, citizens’ abilities to use the justice system effectively to
achieve social change will diminish markedly.  Surrounded by a cul-
ture that celebrates social harmony and self-realization and dispar-
ages social conflict—whatever its causes or aims—citizens’
tendencies to turn to the court as a vehicle for social transformation
will diminish as well.  Over the long run, all of the doors of the
multi-door courthouse may swing outward.
Why should we care?  If disputes are resolved efficiently in pri-
vate by private individuals and organizations, if conflict is avoided
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and citizens learn to seek compromise when disputes do arise,
won’t society be better off?  Leaving aside the still unanswered
question about whether private dispute resolution is, in fact, more
efficient than public dispute resolution, and the considerable evi-
dence that in most circumstances people already avoid conflict by
compromising or “learning to live with” life’s misfortunes and un-
fairness, I think the answer is “no.”  Owen Fiss, Judith Resnik, and
others have written about the importance of public adjudication for
the articulation of legal norms.  I think there are also important po-
litical values that derive from widespread access to, and use of, the
public justice system.
The public spectacle of civil litigation gives life to the “rule of
law.”  To demonstrate that the law’s authority can be mobilized by
the least powerful as well as the most powerful in society, we need
to observe employees and consumers successfully suing large corpo-
rations and government agencies, minority group members success-
fully suing majority group members, and persons engaged in
unpopular activities establishing their legal rights to continue those
activities.
Dispute resolution behind closed doors precludes such obser-
vation.  In a democracy where many people are shut out of legisla-
tive power either because they are too few in number, or too
dispersed to elect representatives, or because they do not have the
financial resources to influence legislators, collective litigation in
class or other mass form provides an alternative strategy for group
action.  Private individualized dispute resolution extinguishes the
possibility of such collective litigation.  Conciliation has much to
recommend it.  But the visible presence of institutionalized and le-
gitimized conflict, channeled productively, teaches citizens that it is
not always better to compromise and accept the status quo because,
sometimes, great gains are to be had by peaceful contest.
